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Abstract 
 
There is extensive debate on the automaticity of attentional processing of 
emotional information. One core feature of automaticity is the independence of 
processing emotion from factors that can affect attention such as cognitive load. In the 
present study we investigated whether processing of emotional facial expressions was 
dependent on cognitive load using a visual search paradigm. Manual responses as well as 
eye-movements were recorded. While both measures showed that emotional information 
captured attention more strongly than neutral information, manual responses indicated 
that load slowed reaction times only for “pop-out” emotion conditions; no increase was 
seen for all-emotional displays. While this suggests that the saliency of emotion was 
reduced, eye movement data showed that effects were caused by improvements for all-
emotional displays in target processing efficiency. Additionally, trait anxiety did not 
influence threat processing, but costs were observed under load that were not present for 
non-anxious subjects. Our results suggest that while load can interfere with task 
performance, it may not affect emotion processing. Our findings highlight the importance 
of eye movement measures in accounting for differences in manual response data and 
provide novel support to theories of anxiety.  
 
 
Keywords: Attention, emotion, eye-movement, visual search, anxiety 
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Introduction 
It has been argued that the cognitive processing of emotional, and especially threat-
related, information has a special status in animals and humans (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 
1987); an important characteristic being its reflexive orienting of attention to threat and 
the prioritization of threat over other stimuli and task-demands. Evolutionary accounts of 
threat processing dictate that such prioritization can be considered adaptive, hard-wired, 
and present in all individuals (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; see Öhman et al., in press this issue). There is also 
emerging evidence from electrophysiological recordings to indicate that early visual 
components are influenced by the emotional significance of stimuli (e.g., Stolarova, Keil, 
& Moratti, 2006). Indeed threat-related stimuli have been shown to activate amygdala 
response even when presented subliminally (Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1996). 
If emotional material is processed pre-attentively, and can have potent effects on 
the orienting of attention, attention itself will not influence initial emotion processing. 
However, recent challenges (see e.g. Pessoa, 2005) have led to considerable debate about 
how threat is processed and whether it depends on attentional resources. For example, 
Stein, Peelen, Funk and Seidl (2010) saw that the advantage for conscious detection of 
threat images in the attentional blink paradigm, compared to positive images, was 
abolished when attention was consumed by another visual task. Pessoa, Kastner and 
Ungerleider (2002) also found that amygdala response to emotion was hampered when 
attentional resources were taxed, and similar findings were reported by Bishop, Jenkins 
and Lawrence (2007). But there is also evidence that emotion can activate the amygdala 
irrespective of the focus of attention (see Vuilleimer, Armony, Driver & Dolan, 2001), 
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and indeed this position is seen as the more traditional belief on the basis of influential 
theories of automaticity such as by LeDoux (1995). 
An important distinction must be made between how emotion may be impacted 
upon by early attention, and how it may interact with later cognitive facets and working 
memory. Models of selective attention such as Load Theory (e.g. Lavie, 2005) propose 
that visual demands on attention reduce early resources available to process additional 
information, extended to include emotional content by others (Pessoa et al, 2002; Bishop, 
Jenkins & Lawrence, 2007). Whether or not demands on early attention (i.e. perceptual 
load) can modulate emotion processing, far less emphasis has been paid on what happens 
when perceptual demands on attention are low. Under this circumstance, it is presumed 
that emotion will be processed automatically, regardless of one‟s view about the 
importance of early attention. Thus, information processing depends upon later cognitive 
influences such as central executive control.  
Working memory is believed to be a major process in keeping one‟s goals in 
mind, and for co-ordinating between tasks (Shallice & Burgess, 1996). For example, in 
visual search, working memory is believed to be used to maintain target information 
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). Therefore, loading working memory should disrupt one‟s 
ability to maintain task goals and lead to increased likelihood of distraction by irrelevant 
information. Consistent with this, cognitive load has been shown to disrupt performance 
in the antisaccade task (Roberts, Hager & Heron, 1994), increase the likelihood of 
attentional capture (Lavie & De Fockert, 2005), and result in greater interference by 
response-competing distracters (De Fockert, Rees, Frith & Lavie, 2001). Individuals 
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lower in working memory capacity have also shown evidence of generally greater 
distraction outside of load manipulations (see Kane & Engle, 2002).  
With this in mind, working memory may also interact with emotion. Previous 
work has focused on how cognitive load can affect response to negative emotion in a 
more thought-driven manner. For instance, whilst conducting working memory tasks like 
digit rehearsal or math problems, feelings towards concurrently presented negative 
images are reduced in intensity (Van Dillen, Heslenfeld & Koole, 2007), and amygdala 
activity to negative emotion can be reduced either by reappraisal and down-regulating 
negative feelings, or equally by distracting oneself with another task (McRae, Hughes, 
Chopra, Gabrieli, Gross & Ochsner, 2010). However, such previous work examines how 
loading working memory can affect emotional responses in the sense of thinking about 
negative emotion; when verbal processes are engaged, it is known that additional thought 
generation or mind wandering is reduced (Teasdale et al, 1995). Thus, evidence that 
negative emotions are attenuated through occupying working memory are interesting, but 
clearly cannot be applied to the idea that the ability of threatening information to capture 
and orient attention is affected by working memory.   
That said, recent studies have proposed that simple threat processing in attention 
tasks can be hampered under cognitive load, though studies investigating this topic are 
few in number. Van Dillen and Koole (2009) induced a cognitive load, either through 
concurrent mathematics or digit rehearsal of one or eight digits, while participants 
responded to the gender identity of angry or happy faces. The authors found that angry 
faces took longer to respond to than happy ones, presumably through the angry faces 
capturing and holding attention, reducing processing efficiency in responding. Under 
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high load, however, the difference between angry and happy trial reaction times was 
abolished. The authors argued that cognitive load may promote the processing of task-
relevant information and reduce the disruptive effect of threat. We note, however, that 
this interpretation is somewhat at odds with previous work suggesting that a cognitive 
load should increase distraction, and also that in their experiments reaction times 
increased under load more for happy than angry trials. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret 
the finding that load increased reaction times to negative emotion to a lesser extent than it 
did for reaction times to positive emotion as evidence that load hampered threat 
processing. Another study by Pecchinenda and Heil (2007) found little impact of 
cognitive load on emotion. In their task (Experiment 3) participants responded to the 
valence of a target word, either positive or negative, superimposed over angry, happy or 
neutral faces. The authors primarily looked for increases in response-competition under 
load, having replicated the effects on wholly neutral stimuli seen by De Fockert et al 
(2001). However, the authors failed to replicate the load effect in this experiment, finding 
a compatibility effect under both load conditions yet no increase, suggesting that 
emotional distraction may be processed independently from working memory 
manipulations. Whether or not load affected reaction times differently for each particular 
expression was not assessed, as the authors‟ focus was on compatibility effects when 
collapsing across distractor expression. Moreover, whether cognitive load could increase 
distraction within the same experiment for non-emotional material could not be gleamed. 
In appreciating these findings, the possible role of working memory in emotion 
processing has thus far found little empirical support. As with non-emotional items, a 
cognitive load may enhance threat processing by reducing one‟s ability to regulate and 
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override threat‟s effect in pulling our attention. Equally, attending to emotion may be 
disrupted if cognitive resources are taxed and attentional reactions to threat require 
working memory to initiate. Finally, threat may grab attention in an automatic manner, 
overriding task goals and orienting attention outside of cognitive control. In the present 
study, we sought to investigate the value of these accounts in a visual search task 
modulating levels of cognitive load.  
Two points set our study apart from previous investigations. Firstly, we aimed to 
assess levels of trait anxiety and how load may affect individuals high or low in such a 
trait differently. Trait anxiety has been associated with a preferential bias in attention 
towards threatening information (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-
Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007, for a review). Interestingly, Bar-Haim et al (2007) 
found that, when anxiety is measured, there seems to be a consistent lack of a threat bias 
for individuals with low levels of anxiety. This point is intriguing considering that threat 
processing is often seen as hard-wired and automatic. It may be that low anxious 
individuals process threat but simply control their attention through working memory and 
prevent orienting of attention towards such items to occur, or that responses are simply 
attenuated when arousal caused by the threat is diminished. While a load on early 
attention has been shown to attenuate threat processing in the amygdala even for high 
anxious subjects (Bishop et al, 2007), how cognitive load may affect threat processing is 
an unanswered question when taking into account anxiety. Secondly, in addition to 
behavioural responses, we also measured eye movements. While comparing manual 
response times are a good measure of distractibility, some authors have argued that the 
presence of threat can speed up behavioural response (Flykt, 2006), while others have 
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suggested that threat might disrupt responding (Mogg, Holmes, Garner & Bradley, 2008). 
Additionally, Derakshan and Koster (2010) demonstrated that eye tracking can reveal 
saccades to distractor items before the target is fixated, and after target fixation prior to 
the manual response being given. Thus, recording eye movements can give additional 
insights into attentional biases that may be masked by simply behavioural reaction time 
data.  
 
The current investigation 
 The present study was designed to examine attentive processing of threat under 
cognitive load, taking previous limitations into account. To reduce ambiguity over the 
dependent measure of attentive processing of threat, we used manual reaction times as 
well as eye-movements as dependent variables in a visual search paradigm. In this task, 
participants can be provided with different type of instructions. In the present study we 
used the “odd-one-out” instructions where individuals were instructed to see whether a 
display of 8 faces contained a face (target) with a different emotional expression. By 
manipulating the emotional expression of the target and the crowd, one can investigate 
speeded threat detection as well as impaired disengagement from threat through the 
examination of response latencies in high versus low anxious individuals.  For example, 
an angry face (target) can be presented in a display of neutral faces (crowd) to investigate 
speeded threat detection. Conversely, a neutral face (target) can be presented among an 
angry crowd to examine attentional disengagement. In previous research, the visual 
search task has shown to be a sensitive paradigm to capture effects of emotional attention 
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and modulation of anxiety-related individual differences (e.g., Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; 
Öhman et al., 2001; Rinck et al., 2005). 
 The following hypotheses were tested in this study. Firstly, if attentive processing 
is an automatic process mainly related to bottom-up characteristics, emotional attention 
will be observed under conditions of cognitive load in similar magnitude. Contrarily, if 
working memory is involved in facilitated detection of threat, emotional attention will be 
reduced by cognitive load as suggested by previous work on thought regulation and 
response-competition. We examined facilitated detection of threat (on trials with 
threatening targets) and disengagement from threat (on trials with threatening distracters) 
under load. Considering cognitive load has been shown to increase interference from 
distracting information, and working memory is involved in modulating attention, this 
could theoretically also result in reduced ability to disengage from threat while 
facilitation itself is unhindered. Finally, we tested whether individual differences in trait 
anxiety influence the attentive processing of threat under cognitive load.  
 
Method 
Participants 
A sample of 63 participants ¹ (39 female) was recruited via advertisements posted 
around the University of London colleges. Participants had a mean age of 28.71 (SD = 
5.89). All had normal to corrected-to-normal vision and were asked to wear their glasses 
or contact lenses if necessary. Participants were paid £5 for participating in the 
experiment. 
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Stimuli 
8 angry, 8 happy, and 8 neutral facial expressions of emotion (half male and half 
female) were selected from three sources of databases of facial expressions, including the 
Ekman and Friesen database (Ekman & Friesen, 1978), the NimStim database 
(Tottenham et al., 2008) and the Karolinska Directed Emotional faces set (Lundqvist & 
Ohman 1998). The faces were presented in greyscale and positioned against a black 
background.  The visual angle subtended by each face, when fixated, was 2˚ 29´ x 4˚ 29´. 
Basic image-statistics were computed and found to be similar for all three expressions. 
The standard deviation of the individual mean luminances, as a fraction of the overall 
mean, was computed. This „coefficient of variation‟ was approximately 1%.  
 
Visual search task 
 Eight faces, arranged in a circle, were simultaneously shown on each trial. All 
faces were in the same frontal (and upright) orientation. The faces were shown in the 
eight „compass-points‟. The eccentricity of each face, when fixating the central cross (i.e. 
the radius of the circle) was 8˚ 15´.  
 For each of the three possible target expressions, there were two alternative non-
target (crowd) expressions. This produced six distinct target/crowd pairings, which were: 
Angry target/Happy crowd, Angry target/Neutral crowd, Happy target/Angry crowd, 
Happy target/Neutral crowd, Neutral target/Angry crowd, and Neutral target/Happy 
crowd. Each target expression appeared on any of the eight faces in the circle, equally 
often. Hence there were 48 distinct target/crowd screens. The design also incorporated 
catch trials, on which eight identical faces (i.e., angry, happy, or neutral) were presented. 
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The presentation of all trials was randomised for every participant. Participants 
completed 6 blocks (3 under cognitive load and 3 under no load) of 60 trials (48 
target/crowd trials and 12 catch trials). A trial began with a fixation cross (width and 
height of 33 pixels) that appeared in the centre of the screen for 1250ms. This was 
followed by the stimulus-screen until a response was made or, in case of no response, for 
5000ms. 
 
Eye-tracking device and controlling software 
 The LC Technologies „Eyegaze‟ system was used to track eye-movements (LC 
Technologies, 2003). This system uses the Pupil-Centre Corneal Reflection method 
(PCCR; Mason, 1969; Merchant & Morrisette, 1973). The eyes are lit by an infra-red 
source and the resulting image of (one of) the eyes is monitored. The gaze-point 
(intersection of the optic axis with the screen) is estimated from the image of the pupil, in 
conjunction with the corneal reflection of the light-source.  
 The screen position of the gaze-point is estimated at 60Hz, with a typical root 
mean square error of less than 0.6˚ (38´). The Eyegaze system estimates participants‟ 
fixations by spatial averaging over groups of gaze-points. A minimum duration of an 
individual fixation is defined as 100ms and the maximum fixation radius is defined as 
0.6˚ (38´).  
 The stimuli were presented in 24-bit colour on a 1024 x 768 LCD (ViewSonic 
700b, cell response-time 35ms). The presentation of the stimuli was controlled by the 
DMDX program (Forster & Forster, 2003), which ensures millisecond timing accuracy. 
Responses were recorded from a button-box (PIO-12 interface), monitored at 1000Hz by 
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DMDX. The Eye-tracking system was automatically synchronised to DMDX at the 
beginning of each trial. The Eye-gaze system is tolerant of small head movements (up to 
32mm in any direction) and able to resume tracking after larger movements. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment took place in a dimly lit room that housed the eye-tracker in the 
Laboratory of Affective and Cognitive Neuroscience at Birkbeck University of London. 
Upon arrival at the laboratory participants completed a measure of trait anxiety 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). They were seated at a distance 
of 60 cm from the eye-tracking device. Participants were instructed to press the 
corresponding button as quickly as possible whenever a face in the circle depicted a 
different expression. They were asked not to respond if all the faces showed the same 
expression. Cognitive load was manipulated in a within-subject design: On half of the 
blocks a two digit number appeared at the beginning of the trial. Participants were asked 
to count backwards in threes, out loudly, from that number, until the end of that trial 
2
. 
The remaining three blocks did not involve any manipulation of load. Orders of blocks 
were counterbalanced across participants. Speed and accuracy of response, as well as the 
need to attend to the fixation cross whenever it appeared on the screen throughout the 
experiment were emphasised.  
Instructions were followed by practice trials for both load and no load conditions 
with the visual search task depicting different faces to those that appeared in the main 
experimental task. The eye-tracking calibration procedure was then run, requiring the 
participant to fixate a series of twelve points on the screen. The main experimental task 
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began as soon as the calibration procedure was completed. Participants were thanked and 
debriefed at the end of the session. 
 
Results 
Participants had a mean trait anxiety score of 39.7 (SD = 11.10; min = 20, max = 
77). To test the effects of anxiety participants were divided into low (N = 29) and high-
trait anxious (N = 32) groups based on a median split on the trait anxiety score: those 
scoring 37 and below were classified as low-anxious, and those scoring above 37 were 
classified as high-anxious. Mean trait anxiety for the low-anxious group was 30.86 (SD = 
4.23) and for the high-anxious group it was 47.72 (SD = 9.09). The two groups differed 
significantly on trait anxiety levels, t(59) = 9.42, p<.001.  
 
Manual responses (reaction times) 
 Reaction times were recorded from the onset of the face array. Less than 3% of 
the data was lost due to outliers (reaction times less, or greater, than 3SD of each 
participant mean). Figure 1 shows mean reaction times for target detection in each of the 
six conditions as a function of cognitive load.  
--------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 here 
------------------- 
A 6 x 2 x 2 Mixed ANOVA with Condition and Load as within-subjects factor and 
Anxiety group as between-subject factor revealed main effects of Condition, F(5,295) = 
130.35, p<.001, η2 = .69, with participants being slowest to detect an angry target in a 
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happy crowd and a happy target in an angry crowd which seemed to be unaffected by 
Load. There was a main effect of Load, F(1,59) = 6.55, p<.02, η2 = .10, with longer 
reaction times under load (M = 1803, SD = 386) than no load (M = 1721, SD = 327). 
There was also a Condition X Load interaction, F(5, 295) = 3.12, p<.02, η2 = .05.  
 Corroborating this interaction, we tested if (a) facilitated detection of threat is 
influenced by cognitive load, and (b) if cognitive load interferes with disengagement 
from threat processing. Analysis showed that load interfered with facilitated detection of 
angry, t(60) = 2.75, p<.01, as well as happy targets, t(60) = 3.05, p<.004, when in neutral 
crowd. Accordingly, participants were slower to detect emotional targets under load 
(angry: M = 1552, SD = 468; happy: M = 1522, SD = 440) compared with no load 
(angry: M = 1423, SD = 384; happy: M = 1417, SD = 352). Analysis also showed that 
load interfered with both the disengagement from threat on trials with a neutral target and 
an angry crowd (no load: M = 1675, SD = 372; load: M = 1788, SD = 439), t(60) = 2.85, 
p < .007, but equally to find a neutral target amongst a happy crowd (no load: M = 1769, 
SD = 410; load: M = 1864, SD = 388), t(60) = 2.39, p = .02.  Finally, load had no 
significant effect on finding an angry target in a happy crowd, t(60) = 1.22, p > .2, or vice 
versa, t < 1.  
Analysis showed a main effect of Anxiety, F(1,59) = 5.17, p < .03, η2 = .08, as 
well as a significant Load X Anxiety interaction, F(1,59) = 5.87, p < .02, η2 = .09. While 
low and high anxious individuals did not differ in their reaction times under the no load 
condition, t(59) = 1.38, p > .1, high anxious individuals showed significantly longer 
reaction times under load, t(59) = 2.81, p < .01. Moreover, low anxious individuals 
showed no actual increase in reaction times generally under load (no load: M = 1661, SD 
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= 297; load: M = 1665, SD = 316), t(28) = .138, p = .89), whilst high anxious individuals 
showed increased costs (no load: M = 1776, SD = 347; load: M = 1929, SD = 405), t(31) 
= 2.97, p < .007). The three-way interaction of Load X Condition X Anxiety was not 
significant, F(5,295) = 1.69, p = .16.  
 
Eye-movement data 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the following indices as a function of 
Condition and Load. For the eye-movement data we presented several indices related to 
initial target detection, attentional disengagement target processing efficiency and 
fixations made after the target was located. Although other indices can also be examined 
(e.g., Derakshan & Koster, 2010), for reasons of parsimony, we selected the indices that 
most directly related to our hypotheses. 
---------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
--------------- 
Time taken to fixate target 
This was defined as the time participants spent on crowd faces prior to fixating 
the target, i.e., the elapsed time between onset of visual display and fixating target. A 6 
(Condition) x 2 (Load) x 2 (Anxiety Group) Mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
Condition, F(5,295) = 120.56, p < .001, η2 = .67, which was qualified by a quadratic 
trend to indicate that participants took longer to fixate target when target and crowd were 
both emotional, followed by conditions where crowd was emotional and target neutral, 
and emotional targets in neutral crowds, F(1,59) = 37.42, p<.001. There was a main 
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effect of Load, F(1,59) = 28.05, p < .001, η2 = .32, with participants taking longer to 
fixate a target under load (M =  1173, SD = 225) than under no load (M = 1050, SD = 
150). Load did not interact with Condition, F < 1.  A two-way interaction of Anxiety X 
Load was observed, F(1,59) = 12.44, p = .001, η2 = .17. This showed that Load affected 
the time taken to fixate target for the high-anxious group (no load: M = 1043, SD = 150; 
load: M = 1241, SD = 247), t(31) = 5.09, p < .001, more than it did in the low-anxious 
group (no load: M = 1059, SD = 153; load: M = 1098, SD = 174), t(28) = 2.05, p = .05. 
No other main effects or interactions were significant. 
 
Mean crowd dwell time 
This was defined as the mean time participants spent on each individual face in 
the crowd before fixating target. This index defined the attention grabbing power of each 
crowd face, i.e., attentional dwell time. A 6 (Condition) x 2 (Load) x 2 (Anxiety group) 
Mixed ANOVA on this data revealed a main effect of Condition, F(5,295) = 33.43, 
p<.001, η2 = .36, qualified with a significant cubic trend, F(1, 59) = 5.09, p<.03, to 
indicate that angry crowd faces grabbed more attention than happy crowd faces followed 
by neutral crowd faces (M = 208 vs. M = 201 vs. M = 187, respectively) . There was a 
Load X Anxiety interaction, F(1,59) = 6.10, p<.02, η2 = .09. High-anxious individuals 
showed a tendency to spend longer fixating each face under load (M = 205, SD = 38), 
compared with no load (M = 198, SD = 24) but this difference was not significant, t(31) = 
1.68, p = .10. On the other hand, low-anxious individuals spent less time fixating each 
face under load (M = 195, SD = 25) compared with no load (M = 200, SD = 23), t(28) = 
2.08, p < .05.   No other effects reached significance.   
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Target processing efficiency 
This was defined as the elapsed time between landing fixation on target and behavioural 
reaction time as assessed by button press, and was used to assess the time taken to 
process the target. A 6 (Condition) x 2 (Load) x 2 (Anxiety Group) Mixed ANOVA 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F(5,295) = 33.67, p < .001, η2 = .36, with 
slowest target processing times for when both target and crowd were emotional and 
fastest target processing times for when an emotional target was embedded in a neutral 
crowd.  There was no main effect of Load, F(1,59) = 2.49, p = .12, but a Load X 
Condition interaction, F(5,295) = 2.83, p<.03, η2 = .05. This interaction showed that load 
enhanced processing efficiency of an angry target in a happy crowd (no load: M = 780, 
SD = 283; load: M = 708, SD = 261), t(60) = 2.44, p < .02, as well as enhanced 
processing of a happy target in an angry crowd (no load: M = 850, SD = 283; load: M = 
777, SD = 314), t(60) = 2.29, p < .03.  This pattern of findings is depicted in Figure 2. 
There was also a main effect of anxiety, F(1,59) = 6.89, p = .011, η2 = .11, with high 
anxious individuals generally slower in target processing (M = 1142, SD = 172) when 
compared to low anxious individuals (M = 1079, SD = 155). Anxiety did not interact 
with load or condition. 
--------------- 
Insert Figure 2 here 
--------------- 
Number of crowd fixations after fixating target 
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 This was defined as the number of fixations participants made on crowd faces 
after fixating target, complimenting target processing time by showing how much of time 
spent between target detection  and pressing a manual response was taken up by 
processing/fixating distractor crowd faces (see Table 1). A 6 (Condition) x 2 (Load) x 2 
(Anxiety Group) Mixed ANOVA revealed a main effect of load, F(1,59) = 11.27, p = 
.001, η2 = .16, with fewer fixations made on distractor crowd faces following fixation on 
target under load (no load: M = 1.25, SD = .58; load: M = 1.07, SD = .56). There was 
also a main effect of condition, F(5,295) = 29.35, p < .001, η2 = .33, with a cubic trend 
showing more post-target fixations made on displays with angry targets and happy 
crowds and vice versa compared to all other conditions, F(1,59) = 11.49, p = .001, η2 = 
.16. A load X condition interaction was also seen, F(5,295) = 6.41, p < .001, η2 = .10, 
qualified by a significant cubic trend (F(1,59) = 4.14, p < .05) indicating  fewer post-
target fixations on crowd items in all-emotional displays under load, followed by neutral 
target in emotional displays and finally emotional target in neutral displays. 
Lastly, there was a main effect of anxiety, F(1,59) = 5.91, p = .02, η2 = .09, 
whereby high anxious participants  made more crowd fixations following landing on 
target compared to low anxious participants (low anxious: M = .99, SD = .36; high 
anxious: M = 1.31, SD = .61). Once more, anxiety did not interact with load or condition.  
  
 
Discussion 
The current study examined whether threat processing is affected by cognitive 
load. In theoretical models of threat processing there is extensive discussion on the 
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degree to which threat processing is influenced by bottom-up characteristics, such as 
stimulus saliency, versus top-down mechanisms such as goal-directed behavior and 
working memory processes in identifying task-relevant and task-irrelevant information 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010; Eysenck et al, 2007; Mathews et al, 1997). Examining whether 
threat processing is affected by cognitive load provides a partial answer to the question of 
whether threat processing occurs in an automatic fashion, independent from the 
availability of cognitive resources or alternatively is influenced by shared resources with 
other aspects of working memory (Pessoa et al, 2002), or can be suppressed by cognitive 
control. In order to obtain a fine-grained picture of the influence of cognitive load on 
various components of attentive processing of threat we combined a visual search 
paradigm with eye-registration methodology. The results of this study indicate that 
emotional information captures and holds attention more strongly than neutral 
information, that cognitive load appeared to hamper emotion processing, and that anxiety 
was associated with greater costs to performance under load. These findings are 
discussed below. 
 
Emotion captures and holds attention 
 In the current study manual response time as well as eye-movement data indicate 
that emotional information captured attention. That is, emotional targets in neutral 
crowds were responded to faster than neutral targets in emotional crowds. Moreover, 
initial target fixation to emotional targets was faster than to neutral targets, and 
attentional dwell time was longer for emotional crowds compared with neutral crowds. 
Interestingly, in our data there was little evidence for a threat superiority effect, which 
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has been observed in several previous studies (e.g., Fox et al, 2000). In this regard, it is 
worth mentioning that several studies now indicate that valence per se is not the most 
important determining factor for attentional capture but that the arousal value of stimuli is 
associated with attentional capture (Schimmack, 2005; Vogt, De Houwer, Crombez, 
Koster, & Van Damme, 2008), which also argues against the notion of threat-superiority. 
 
Emotion processing under load 
With regard to our specific predictions of threat processing under load, we found 
that threat processing was hampered under cognitive load at the level of manual 
responses and, through eye-tracking data, that this effect was driven by an increased time 
to fixate the target, but crucially not due to more fixations made on distracters. Thus, our 
findings suggest that diverting cognitive resources between the visual search and 
counting tasks caused a general slow-down in responses.  
Interestingly, examining manual responses, load appeared to slow reaction times 
in all conditions except when a happy face was presented in an angry crowd or vice 
versa. Superficially, this would suggest that load may have disrupted the emotional 
saliency of information; an angry/happy face in a neutral crowd would take longer to find 
if the saliency of the emotional target was reduced, and equally a neutral target in an 
emotional crowd would stand-out less if target to non-target similarity is increased 
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). For trials already requiring serial search, however, such 
as all-emotional displays, if load hampered emotional saliency then reaction times would 
be less affected as the target cannot “pop-out” as easily to begin with. 
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However, with the aid of eye-movement measurement, we were able to pinpoint 
this discrepancy precisely; load appeared to improve target processing efficiency time for 
all-emotional displays, explaining why reaction times suffered in all other conditions but 
not these, and why there was no interaction of load and condition in time taken to fixate 
target. Thus, while the cost of load seemed to affect conditions differently, as indicated 
by increased response times, our eye-movement data shows that we cannot solely rely on 
manual response times to determine emotion-specific attentive processing. Rather, under 
increased cognitive demands, all displays were simply more difficult to efficiently 
complete regardless of emotional valence (in the sense of time to fixate target), 
demonstrating that target items involving emotion are not immune to cognitive 
interference caused by cognitive load and yet are not differentially affected.  
Why target processing efficiency for all-emotional displays was enhanced under 
load is unclear, but when measuring fixations made to other crowd items following 
landing fixation on target, we saw that load not only reduced this interference to 
processing efficiency but reduced it most for all-emotional displays. Thus, once 
participants had fixated a discrepant emotional target in an emotional crowd, they were 
faster to respond and made fewer follow-up eye movements under load than in other 
conditions.  
 
Interactions of emotion and cognition 
While the differences in condition response times under load were pinpointed by 
differences in target processing efficiency, performing a concurrent task did not increase 
or decrease the saliency of emotional relative to neutral targets. However, a general cost 
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in time to fixate target was observed under load regardless of valence. In this sense, our 
data suggests that cognitive load does have an effect on emotion processing, but only in 
affecting the cognitive factors involved in visual search and orienting attention such as 
the role of working memory in keeping the target template in mind during such tasks 
(Duncan & Humphreys, 1989).  
With regard to whether cognitive resources are required in processing emotion, 
our manual response data supported this assumption by suggesting that emotion lost its 
salient qualities under load, though this finding was negated by the vital inclusion of eye 
movement recording. Thus, we cannot conclude that emotion processing does require 
cognitive resources and, as outlined in our Introduction, there is inconclusive evidence to 
suggest that it does. It remains possible that our load manipulation, counting back in 
multiples of three, was not a strong enough demand and that a more potent load may have 
caused differences seen in emotion processing. What is clear, however, is that load can 
have differential effects on conditions in target processing efficiency in visual search 
tasks. As a consequence, future work may benefit from utilizing eye-tracking as a 
measure, as our data provides a cautionary note in interpreting purely behavioural 
responses that showed an interaction of load and condition that was not seen in eye 
movement latencies to fixate targets. 
 
Anxiety under cognitive load 
Finally, our findings with regard to the influence of trait anxiety require some 
consideration. In previous work, individual differences in anxiety levels were often 
neglected, which is problematic as the automaticity of threat processing may vary 
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between high and low anxious individuals (see Fox et al, 2005; Bar-Haim et al, 2007). If 
threat processing is more automatic in high anxious individuals, this would be less 
affected by cognitive load in high compared with low anxious individuals. In the current 
study we tested a relatively large sample and used a median-split procedure to explore 
influences of anxiety on threat processing. Overall we failed to find that high anxious 
individuals‟ threat processing was less affected by cognitive load compared with low 
anxious individuals, and indeed no marked difference even under the no load condition.  
However, we found that anxious subjects were generally slower in reaction times 
in the visual search task. Eye movement data showed that high anxious subjects also 
demonstrated reduced target processing efficiency between fixating target and 
responding, which was likely driven by further fixations on distractors once the target had 
been fixated. This may suggest that anxious subjects were more likely to doubt their 
choice on finding the target, and so increased the likelihood of checking nearby distractor 
faces prior to manual response.  Crucially, we also noted a number of interesting 
interactions with anxiety under load for both manual responses and eye movements. 
When a load was imposed, high anxious subjects experienced slower response times 
whereas low anxious individuals showed no evidence of a cost. Eye movement data 
demonstrated that this effect was caused by longer latencies before landing fixation on 
target, possibly explained by increased fixations on crowd items under load that just 
missed significance, whereas the low anxious made significantly fewer crowd fixations 
under load.  
Taken together, our findings support theories of trait anxiety such as Attentional 
Control Theory (ACT; Eysenck et al, 2007), which posits that anxiety is associated with 
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reduced cognitive efficiency. Moreover, our findings of increased detriments to 
performance under load also support ACT‟s prediction that anxious individuals can 
attempt to compensate for reduced cognitive efficiency by utilizing cognitive effort to 
placate this. With the imposition of cognitive load, compensatory strategies may have 
been disrupted as resources were diluted across two concurrent tasks, explaining why 
anxious participants showed costs under load whereas non-anxious participants did not. 
Thus, manipulations of cognitive load may be a useful tool in elucidating attentional 
control deficits in anxiety that may sometimes be camouflaged under less demanding 
conditions by compensatory cognitive strategies (see Ansari & Derakshan, 2011b).  
 
Conclusions 
The findings of the current investigation contribute to the literature in several 
important ways. First, in a visual search paradigm that is suitable to find attentional 
capture and holding effects of threat, we observed that emotional information in general 
demands attention. There was no evidence for threat specificity at any of the attentional 
indices, although processing of angry and happy faces did differ strongly at the level of 
target processing. These findings argue against a threat superiority effect which is in line 
with several recent studies that have observed little evidence for strong automatic threat 
processing (Calvo, Gutiérrez, & Fernández-Martín, this issue; Huijding, Mayer, Koster, 
& Muris, 2011). Moreover, the results of the present study are of importance to the 
debate on the automaticity of threat processing; that is, strong claims have been put 
forward about the automaticity of threat processing. Our data provide important evidence 
that threat processing can be affected by cognitive load at the level of attentive processing 
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in terms of a slowdown, but that emotion advantages in prioritizing attention are 
generally maintained across conditions. Furthermore, our data indicate that threat 
processing is also perhaps not more automatic in anxious individuals. Lastly, our data 
point to a cost in task performance and reaction time in anxiety that is further revealed by 
cognitive load. 
Clearly several limitations require consideration here. First, although stimulus 
material was carefully selected, one could argue that visual search was mainly performed 
through analysis of visual features of discrepant faces rather than the emotional 
expression of the faces, with a feature–based search not being divergent in high versus 
low anxious individuals. Yet, this account cannot explain the specific divergent pattern of 
eye-movements with and without cognitive load and the findings at the level of the target 
processing index. The latter findings suggest some degree of emotion processing during 
visual search instead of a purely feature-based search. Secondly, we presented the 
analyses based on median-split to ensure appropriate statistical power. It is important that 
we recognize some of the problems noted with regard to median-split analysis, however 
similar effects were obtained when using more extreme scores on anxiety (tertiary split). 
In sum, the current study shows that cognitive load can hamper effective visual 
search, including when that search involves emotion, arguing against strong claims of 
automaticity in emotional items capturing attention immediately and unaffected by 
current cognitive demands. However, emotion processing itself was relatively unaffected 
under load, with manual response differences explained through the use of eye movement 
data, and suggesting that process of emotion capturing attention may not be dependent 
upon cognitive resources, but simply slowed down. With the benefits of eye movement 
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data, we were able to localize the effects of load on both differences in emotion 
conditions and in trait anxiety performance, finding specific effects on target search time 
under load, and more general effects on target processing efficiency. Utilizing similar 
methodologies, future work may produce a more fine-grained analysis of how attentional 
processes are influenced by variables such as emotion, cognitive load, and anxiety. 
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Footnote 
1 The data for two participants were discarded due to poor calibration. 
2 Participants‟ performance while counting was monitored by the experimenter who sat 
outside the testing cubicle, and prompted the participant if counting incorrectly. All 
participants performed the counting task at ceiling level.  
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Table 1. Patterns of eye-movements prior to, and after, fixating target as a function of 
valence of target and crowd, and load (NL = no load, L = Load) 
 Condition (Target in Crowd) 
 
Eye-movement 
index 
 Angry in 
Happy 
 
Angry 
in 
Neutral 
Happy 
in 
Angry 
Happy in 
Neutral 
Neutral in 
Angry 
Neutral 
in 
Happy 
  M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
 
Time taken to 
fixate target (in 
ms) 
NL 
 
L 
1194 
(195.74) 
1304 
(248.03) 
836 
(193.97) 
948 
(295.52) 
1292 
(203.00) 
1384 
(306.03) 
843 
(185.87) 
977 
(266.86) 
1058 
(194.36) 
1201 
(268.59) 
1081 
(216.06) 
1226 
(250.90) 
Crowd attentional 
dwell time (in ms) 
NL 
 
L 
203  
(27.30) 
205 
(34.55) 
185 
(23.99) 
188 
(42.63) 
212 
(25.72) 
210 
(34.45) 
188 
(28.26) 
191 
(37.32) 
208 
(29.56) 
205 
(36.21) 
198 
(29.36) 
205 
(37.70) 
Number of crowd 
fixations made 
after landing 
target 
NL 
 
L 
1.58 
(.83) 
1.16 
(.70) 
0.95 
(.61) 
1.03 
(.61) 
1.68 
(.83) 
1.36 
(.89) 
1.00 
(.63) 
0.93 
(.58) 
1.04 
(.59) 
0.88 
(.51) 
1.23 
(.72) 
1.04 
(.72) 
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Figure captions 
Figure 1. Mean reaction times to target as a function of target and crowd emotional 
expression in low- and high-anxious groups (bars indicate standard errors). 
Figure 2. Target processing efficiency as a function of load (bars indicate standard 
errors). 
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